



Model UN of the Russian Far East

ANNUAL

CONFERENCE 2018

SECURITY COUNCIL

*BACKGROUND
GUIDE*

Vladivostok
Far Eastern Federal University
December 7-10, 2018



TABLE OF CONTENTS

WELCOMING LETTER	3
1. SECURITY COUNCIL OVERVIEW.....	4
1.1 HISTORY	4
1.2 MANDATE, FUNCTIONS AND POWERS	4
1.3 STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP	6
1.4 CURRENT SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP	7
1.5 BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	8
2. THE SITUATION CONCERNING RWANDA (1994).....	9
2.1 MAIN TERMS AND DEFINITIONS.....	9
2.2 INTRODUCTION	10
2.3 INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL FRAMEWORK.....	13
2.4 CURRENT ACTIONS AND PLANNED INITIATIVES.....	17
ARGENTINA.....	18
BRAZIL	18
CHINA	19
CZECH REPUBLIC	19
DJIBOUTI.....	19
FRANCE.....	20
NEW ZEALAND.....	20
NIGERIA	20
OMAN.....	21
PAKISTAN.....	21
RUSSIAN FEDERATION.....	21
RWANDA.....	22
SPAIN	22
UNITED KINGDOM.....	23

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.....	23
2.5 CONCLUSION.....	23
2.6 BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	24
2.7 FURTHER RESEARCH	25
3. THE OPEN AGENDA	26
3.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION	26
3.2 MIDDLE EASTERN ISSUES	26
THE SITUATION IN SYRIA.....	26
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION	27
3.3 AFRICAN ISSUES	27
THE SITUATION IN LIBYA	27
3.4 GLOBAL ISSUES	28
CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICTS.....	28
3.5 BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	29
3.6 FURTHER RESEARCH	29

WELCOMING LETTER

Distinguished delegates,

It is a pleasure to welcome you to the MUNRFE Annual Conference 2018, and it is a privilege to address to you as representatives of the Security Council.



The parts of the SC simulation you will take part in – the historical segment and the modern one – have

their specific features and differences, and both are intriguing not only for academic research but also for debates. The Rwandan crisis became the first precedent of several ambiguous processes which strongly affect international relations even today, while even the choice of a topic for the open agenda item to consider is a discussion which demands a certain attention and approach.

However, regardless of agenda items and the formats of debates, the United Nations Security Council is always the most competitive and preparation-demanding committee of any MUN conference, and the Council I am going to preside over this December will not be an exception. Thus, I hope you will find the SC Background Guide useful as a basis for your general preparation and as a source of inspiration for further research.

Strong stamina and indestructible self-confidence, as well as an ability to be flexible, are qualities which best describe a successful SC delegate, thus let me conclude by wishing you to make correct decisions and have the power to follow them.

Aleksei Stanonis

President of the Security Council

MUNRFE Annual Conference 2018

1. SECURITY COUNCIL OVERVIEW

1.1 History

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is a principal organ of the United Nations (UN), which, in accordance with Chapter V, Article 24 of the UN Charter has “the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”.¹ It is one of the six main bodies of the UN.

The United Nations appeared due to a number of objective factors of the strategic, political and economic development of human society at the end of the second millennium. On 1 January 1942, in Washington, D.C., the Declaration of the United Nations was signed by 26 states, all of whom were participants in the anti-Hitler coalition. Later, the name "United Nations" was officially used in the UN Charter. The Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) established six principal organs of the Organization, including the Security Council.²

The Security Council held its first session on 17 January 1946 at Church House, Westminster, London. Since its first meeting, the Security Council has taken up permanent residence at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City. It has also traveled to many cities, holding sessions in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1972, in Panama City, Panama, in 1973, and in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1990.³

1.2 Mandate, Functions and Powers

Established by the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, the Security Council holds the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”.⁴ It is organized so as to be able to function continuously, and a representative of each of its members is required to be present at the United Nations Headquarters (UN HQ) at all times. The majority of the Council’s work concerns the resolution of ongoing conflicts and security crises in defined geographic areas. However, during the last decade, its agenda has steadily broadened to include more open topics. Terrorism and non-proliferation have become prominent agenda items, as have attempts to define:

¹ United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” 26 June 1945, accessed 12 October 2018, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-v/index.html>.

² United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” Chapter III, Article 7.

³ United Nations Security Council, “What is the Security Council,” accessed 18 October 2018, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/>.

⁴ United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” Chapter V, Article 24.

- security more broadly, to include themes such as women and international peace and security;
- children and armed conflicts; responsibility to protect.

As one of the primary organs of the United Nations, the executive function of the Council has one unique feature – the Council’s resolutions are binding for all UN Member States as stated in Chapter V, Article 25 of the UN Charter.⁵

In accordance with Security Council procedure, it also holds the so-called “Security Council Priority,” meaning that the Security Council is an absolutely independent Body and while the Security Council is exercising, in respect to any dispute or situation, the functions assigned to it by the UN Charter, no other Body shall make any recommendations with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.⁶

The UN Security Council is responsible for the:

- maintenance of international peace and security;⁷
- recommendation of candidates for the office of the UN Secretary-General;⁸
- consideration of new Member States for admission by the General Assembly.⁹

The UN Security Council is empowered to:

- determine the existence of any threat to the peace, break of the peace, or act of aggression;¹⁰
- undertake, if necessary, investigation and mediation; set principles for peaceful settlements of conflicts and declare cease-fire directives for the parties of the conflict;¹¹
- call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable;¹²
- impose economic sanctions (in particular-embargoes) on arms, diamonds, luxury goods and materials related to nuclear programs or ballistic missiles;¹³
- decide on any enforcement measures, which may lead to the establishment of peace and security in the conflict region, e.g. send the United Nations peace-keeping forces to help reduce tensions in troubled areas or keep opposing forces;
- cooperate with any international organization or another body of the United Nations and to authorize the collaborating party on any actions determined by a certain resolution;¹⁴

⁵ United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” Chapter V, Article 25.

⁶ United Nations Security Council, “Provisional Rules of Procedure,” Chapter VI, Rule 33.

⁷ United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” Chapter V, Article 24.

⁸ United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” Chapter XV, Article 97.

⁹ United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” Chapter II, Article 4.

¹⁰ United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” Chapter VII, Article 39.

¹¹ United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” Chapter VI.

¹² United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” Chapter VII, Article 40.

¹³ United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” Chapter VII, Article 41.

¹⁴ United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” Chapter VII, Article 48.

- recommend the General Assembly to expel a Member State which has violated the principles and/or the Charter of the UN;¹⁵
- establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions, such as the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; committees responsible for monitoring trade sanctions; the Counter-Terrorism Committee; the 1540 Committee, the Peacebuilding Commission, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and etc.¹⁶ A State which is a member of the United Nations but at that moment does not have a seat in the Security Council may participate, without a vote, in its discussions when the Council considers that that country's interests are affected¹⁷. Both members of the United Nations and non-members, if they are parties to a dispute being considered by the Council, are invited to take part, without a vote, in the Council's discussions; the Council sets the conditions for participation of a non-member state.¹⁸

The Council passes formal decisions in the format of resolutions numbered sequentially from Resolution 1, passed in 1946, to Resolutions numbered above 2000 today. However, for each MUNRFE session, the numeration of Council resolutions starts from 1. Procedural matters are decided by nine affirmative votes, while substantive questions require the affirmative vote of nine members, with no permanent member voting against.¹⁹ This so-called “veto” power means that each permanent member may prevent the passage of any resolution regardless of the votes of other members of the Council.

1.3 Structure and Membership

The Security Council is composed of 15 Members:

- five permanent members (P5): China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States;
- ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly (with the end of term date).

Over 70 United Nations Member States have never been Members of the Security Council. A State which is a Member of the United Nations but not of the Security Council may participate, without a vote, in its discussions when the Council considers that the country's interests are affected. Both Members and non-members of the United Nations, if they are parties to a dispute being considered by the Council, may be invited to take part, without a vote, in the Council's discussions; the Council sets the conditions for participation by a non-member State.

¹⁵ United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” Chapter II, Article 6.

¹⁶ United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” Chapter V, Article 29.

¹⁷ United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” Chapter V, Article 31.

¹⁸ United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” Chapter V, Article 32.

¹⁹ United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” Chapter VI, Article 37.

1.4 Current Security Council Membership

Country	End-of-Term	Representative
Bolivia	2018	H.E. Pedro Inchauste Jordán
China	P5	H.E. Ma Zhaoxu
Côte d'Ivoire	2019	H.E. Kacou Houadja Léon Adom
Equatorial Guinea	2019	H.E. Mr. Anatolio Ndong Mba
Ethiopia	2018	H.E. Taye Atske Selassie Amde
France	P5	H.E. François Delattre
Kazakhstan	2018	H.E. Kairat Umarov
Kuwait	2019	H.E. Mansour Ayyad Al-Otaibi
Netherlands	2018	H.E. Karel J.G. van Oosterom
Peru	2019	H.E. Gustavo Meza-Cuadra
Poland	2019	H.E. Joanna Wronecka
Russian Federation	P5	H.E. Nebenzia Vassily Alekseevich
Sweden	2018	H.E. Olof Skoog
United Kingdom	P5	H.E. Karen Pierce
United States	P5	H.E. Nikki R. Haley

1.5 Bibliography

Sievers, Loraine and Sam Daws. *The Procedure of the UN Security Council* (Fourth edition). New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

United Nations Security Council. "Provisional Rules of Procedure." Accessed 12 October 2018. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/rules/chapter6.shtml>.

United Nations Security Council. "What is the Security Council." Accessed 12 October 2018. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/>.

United Nations. "Charter of the United Nations." Accessed 12 October 2018. <http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html>.

2. THE SITUATION CONCERNING RWANDA (1994)

2.1 Main terms and definitions

Historical MUN – a format of a Model UN committee, which gives its participants an opportunity to simulate the work of a UN body session that took place in the past. In frames of this type of simulation, the participants start their work from a certain point in real chronology, but during the session, the Secretariat announces a “crisis”, and after that, a divergent path of history begins. It depends on the decisions of the Council only. The main advantage of this format is that the participants have a chance to learn whether it was possible to remake history or not during the events that changed the world.

Crisis – an unstable or crucial time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is impending.²⁰ In terms of an MUN simulation, a “crisis” is an event that happens during the simulation that never actually took place in the real world, had a place in the real world at a different time or had a place in the real world but with some substantive change for the purposes of the conference.

Genocide – a term, which was used for the first time by Polish lawyer Raphaël Lemkin in 1944 in his book “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe”, describing the process of the Holocaust. It was officially recognized as a crime under international law in 1946 by the United Nations General Assembly.²¹ It was codified as an independent crime in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention). In accordance to this document and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group:

1. Killing members of the group;
2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
5. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.²²

²⁰ Oxford University, “Oxford living dictionaries,” Crisis, accessed 12 October 2018, <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/>.

²¹ UN GA, *The Crime of Genocide*, A/RES/96-I, 11 December 1996, accessed 12 October 2018, [http://undocs.org/A/RES/96\(I\)](http://undocs.org/A/RES/96(I)).

²² International Criminal Court, “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” accessed 12 October 2018, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/RomeStatutEng1.pdf>.

Hutu – an ethnic group, whose members live within Rwanda and Burundi. Numbering about 9,500,000 in the late 20th century, the Hutu comprise the vast majority in both countries but were traditionally subject to the Tutsi.²³

Tutsi – an ethnic group, whose members live within Rwanda and Burundi. The Tutsi formed the traditional aristocratic minority in both countries, constituting about 9 percent and 14 percent of the population, respectively.²⁴

To disenfranchise – to take away power or opportunities, especially the right to vote, from a person or group.²⁵

Emancipation – the process of giving people social or political freedom and rights.²⁶

Refugee – a person forced to flee their country because of violence or persecution.²⁷

2.2 Introduction

During the historical part of the SC simulation, delegates are to consider the issue of an escalation of a conflict between the two main ethnic groups of the Republic of Rwanda, the Hutus and the Tutsis, in frames of the UN Security Council meeting which was conducted on 17 February 1994. As were the majority of conflicts in Africa and the Middle East, the confrontation was based on a series of minor conflicts strongly connected with the colonial activity of European states in the past. To understand the situation in Rwanda, it is vital to understand the history behind the situation and the events that culminated with the crisis.

Rwanda was recognized as a territory associated with Germany by the Berlin Conference of 1884, but during World War I it was occupied by Belgium.²⁸ Under the Belgian administration, traditional Tutsi supremacy, which was based on the historical role division between the ethnic groups, was approved, while the Hutus were disenfranchised. In 1935, Belgium established a system of segregation, implemented as identity cards labeling each individual as either Tutsi or

²³ Encyclopedia Britannica, “Hutu,” accessed 12 October 2018, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hutu>.

²⁴ Encyclopedia Britannica, “Tutsi,” accessed 12 October 2018, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Tutsi>.

²⁵ Cambridge University, “Cambridge Dictionary,” Disenfranchise, accessed 12 October 2018, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/ru/%D1%81%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%8C/%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B3%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9/disenfranchise>.

²⁶ Cambridge University, “Cambridge Dictionary,” Emancipation, accessed 12 October 2018, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/ru/%D1%81%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%8C/%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B3%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9/emancipation?q=Emancipation>.

²⁷ UNHCR, “Emergency Handbook,” accessed 13 October 2018, <https://emergency.unhcr.org/>.

²⁸ South Africa History Online, “Rwanda,” accessed 12 October 2018, <https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/rwanda>.

Hutu.²⁹ As a result, any interethnic mobility was prevented, and two groups on the same territory started to identify themselves as not only different groups but also as opposite entities.

After World War II, the Hutus commenced an emancipation process in Rwanda.³⁰ It was caused by two main reasons. Firstly, they got certain educational and propaganda support from the Catholic Church, which was mostly concentrated on work with repressed Hutus than with other ethnic groups.³¹ Secondly, the traditional role separation, where the Hutus were farmers and the Tutsi were warriors and pastoralists, started to collapse. Consequently, the Hutus recognized themselves as a commonality with common interests, and the absolute majority of the Hutus became unsatisfied with its subordinate status to the absolute minority of the Tutsis.³²

In 1957, several representatives of newly-formed Hutu intelligent elite published the "Bahutu Manifesto", which was the first document that declared the Tutsi and the Hutus as different races and claimed a necessity to transfer the political power from Tutsi to Hutus because of a "statistical law", which was exactly a reflection of Hutu numerical superiority.³³ Previously, the ethnic confrontation had taken place between the political elites only; however, the "Bahutu Manifesto" became a basis for a system of Hutu hegemonic propaganda.

In 1959, a Hutu leader was attacked by supporters of a pro-Tutsi party. He survived, but rumors appeared that he had been killed. As a response, a pro-Hutu party started to murder Tutsis, making no difference between organized activists responsible for the attack, and the innocent civil population, even in the capital of Rwanda, Kigali.³⁴ These series of events were called the Rwandan Revolution. Unlike the previous state of affairs, the Belgian administration supported the Hutu majority in order to save its influence over the country.

In 1960, the colonial administration replaced all the local leadership with representatives of Hutus and conducted commune elections. Shortly thereafter, the Tutsi monarchy was replaced with a Hutu-centric republic, and in 1962 Rwanda became an independent state.³⁵ As far as the confrontation was progressing, the Tutsi were leaving Rwanda to escape Hutu repressions:

²⁹ Prevent genocide international, "Indangamuntu 1994: Ten years ago in Rwanda this Identity Card cost a woman her life," accessed 12 October 2018, <http://www.preventgenocide.org/edu/pastgenocides/rwanda/indangamuntu.htm>.

³⁰ History world, "History of Rwanda," accessed 12 October 2018, <http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ad24>.

³¹ Ivan Krivushin, *The Church and the Rwandan genocide 1994* (Moscow: New and recent history, 2014), 5.

³² Ivan Krivushin, *Preparation of the Rwandan genocide 1994: organizing centers and tools* (Moscow: New and recent history, 2012), 7-10.

³³ Africa Report, "The Bahutu Manifesto 1957 – The emergence of the Hutu Power in Rwanda," accessed 12 October 2018, <https://fulviobeltramiAfrica.wordpress.com/2014/01/14/the-bahutu-manifesto-1957-the-emergence-of-the-hutu-power-in-rwanda/>.

³⁴ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Refworld, "Rwanda: the preventable genocide," accessed 12 October 2018, <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4d1da8752.pdf>.

³⁵ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Rwanda: the preventable genocide."

murdering the civil population, forced eviction of Tutsi from Hutu villages, and extrajudicial depriving of Tutsi property. A notable feature of post-colony states is in most cases they are not situated in the borders of their main ethnic groups living space, and in case of the Tutsi, lots of their representatives were concentrated closely to Rwandan borders in neighboring states.³⁶ As a result, Rwandan Tutsi got certain support from their local relatives when the local authorities began to force these refugees to go back.

They formed armed groups, named “inyenzi” (“cockroaches”), in order to return to occupy the borderlands of Rwanda and to resist Hutu dominated governmental forces. These attempts were mostly blocked by the Rwandan regime almost immediately, especially because supporting the official Kigali was considered by the international community the best way to keep the country stable.³⁷ The reason for that position is that the view to the situation in Rwanda was mostly formed by ex-colonial authority of the region, Belgium and France.

In 1964, about 300,000 Tutsi left the country with no ability to return for more than thirty years because of oppression by the Hutus.³⁸ The discrimination of Tutsi was continued in Rwanda, but it was decreased as a result of a coup d'état in 1973. The coup was caused by internal tensions of Hutus. The government was lobbying the interests of southern Hutus while the army was mostly composed of the northern sub-ethnic group. The new president, Mr. Juvenal Habyarimana, decided to get the support of Tutsi in order to save his power and protect his government, and the repressions against the Tutsis started to decrease. Even though, Rwanda's population had increased from 1.6 million people in 1934 to 7.1 million in 1989, leading to competition for land. As a result, the state policy of oppression was replaced with civil confrontation.³⁹

In 1990, about 4,000 armed Tutsi rebels entered Rwandan territory in 60 km under the banner of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), formed on the territory of Uganda. Troops of France and Zaire supported the Rwandan army, allowing them to repel the invasion. Paul Kagame, the head of the rebels, organized a retreat to northern Rwanda, habited with the mostly Tutsi population.⁴⁰

In 1991 the RPF launched military actions again. Tutsi combat groups occupied the town of Ruhengeri and surrounding territories, using the fact that this attack was not predicted by their opponents. Next year the RPF started an active guerrilla war in order not to destroy the Hutu

³⁶ Ivan Krivushin, *The Rwandan genocide at the local level (considering south-west communes of the province of Ruhengeri)* (Moscow: Institute of world history, 2012), 15.

³⁷ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Rwanda: the preventable genocide.”

³⁸ Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (Second edition)* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 173–174.

³⁹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Rwanda: the preventable genocide.”

⁴⁰ Ivan Krivushin, *The Rwandan genocide: reasons, nature, value* (Moscow: Publishing House of Higher School of Economics, 2009), 19.

regime, supported with the majority of Rwandan population and the international community, but to make it recognize the RPF as an official counterpart and establish peace negotiations. In 1992 the RPF agreed to a ceasefire and conduct negotiations with the Rwandan government, but in 1993 non-governmental radical Hutu groups organized several violations of a ceasefire with attacking civilian Tutsi population in Rwanda. Therefore, the RPF stopped any negotiations and responded with a massive attack, taking a notable part of Rwandan northern territories under control.⁴¹

However, peace talks proceeded in the city of Arusha, Tanzania, organized by the United States of America, France and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In accordance with adopted documents, which were named as the Arusha Accords, signed on August 4, 1993, the RPF reached notable success in negotiation positions. Most importantly, it got quite influential positions in Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG), which it was agreed to establish as a provisional supreme collegial institution in the state.⁴² That was a significant attempt for the peaceful solution of the conflict because both of sides were granted with proportional influence on the state at the level of elites, and the same rights at the level of the population.

The Arusha Accords contained a request for the deployment of international peacekeeping forces in Rwanda in order to maintain the implementation of the agreements the sides adopted. Even though it was declared as a demonstration of the fact that both actors were striving to reach a peaceful solution, in reality, the government realized that it was not able to overcome the resistance of the Tutsis with force. As a result, the UN was invited not as a mediator of the process of the reintegration of the country, but as a short-term solution for the time in which the government needed to accumulate the resources for an attack.

2.3 International and regional framework

The UN was already involved in the region at the request of the governments of both Uganda and Rwanda for a neutral force positioned on their joint border to verify Uganda's claim that it was not supporting the RPF rebels.⁴³ On 22 June 1993, the Security Council created the UN

⁴¹ Krivushin, *The Rwandan genocide: reasons, nature, value*, 7.

⁴² International Conflict Research Institute, "Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front," accessed 14 October 2018, <http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/rwan1.pdf>.

⁴³ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Rwanda: the preventable genocide."

Observer Mission in Uganda/Rwanda (UNOMUR) under the command of Canadian General Romeo Dallaire with its Resolution 846.⁴⁴

Two months later, on August 4, the Arusha Accords were signed, including a call for a peacekeeping force, in contrast with the observing mandate, to help ensure its implementation.⁴⁵ However, the Security Council responded with a delay. Unfortunately, the country was not so crucially important for the region as Egypt or Nigeria neither because the geographic position, nor because of the amount of population, and the members of the Council have not shown enough interest to the situation in Rwanda. Despite the warning by the Secretary-General that such a delay would “seriously jeopardize” the agreement, it took the Security Council eight weeks from the signing of the Accords to approve transforming the UNOMUR into United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) on October 5, 1993, which included the deployment of peacekeeping forces in the area.⁴⁶

The Arusha Accords had begun a competition between the UN and the OAU, both of which made proposals to act as a peacekeeping institution. UN Secretary-General Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, however, stated that Security Council members would not fund an operation they did not command and control. The government of Rwanda itself strongly insisted on the UN involvement.⁴⁷ As for the OAU, without external resources, it realized, that it lacked the capacity to play a major role in the peacekeeping operation. In the end, the negotiating parties identified the UN as the main implementing agency for the Arusha Accords.⁴⁸ It became an important step that shifted lead responsibility for conflict management from continental and sub-regional actors to the UN.

There was a serious obstacle in US-UN negotiations. The administration of President Bill Clinton represented forthrightly at the UN by Ambassador Madeleine Albright, was determined to minimize the costs of any Rwandan operations, which meant limiting the size of the force. General Romeo Dallaire, who moved from commander of UNOMUR to commander of UNAMIR, asked for 4,500 soldiers because he did not believe he could get more. The US initially proposed 500; the total finally agreed was 2,548.⁴⁹ However, the full force was not

⁴⁴ UN SC, *The situation concerning Rwanda*, S/RES/846, 22 June 1993, accessed 12 October 2018, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/846>.

⁴⁵ International Conflict Research Institute, “Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front.”

⁴⁶ UN SC, *The situation concerning Rwanda*, S/RES/872, 5 October 1993, accessed 12 October 2018, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/540/63/PDF/N9354063.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁴⁷ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Rwanda: the preventable genocide.”

⁴⁸ Krivushin, *The Rwandan genocide at the local level (considering south-west communes of the province of Ruhengeri)*, 8.

⁴⁹ Ivan Krivushin, *One hundred days in the power of madness: The Rwandan genocide 1994* (Moscow: Publishing House of Higher School of Economics, 2015), 10.

deployed until months later, shortly before the genocide began. Moreover, the peacekeeping personnel was only deployed in the capital of the state and had no influence outside Kigali.⁵⁰

To further complicate matters, when some of the contingents did finally arrive in Rwanda they did not have even the minimum scale of equipment needed to accomplish their tasks. Further, the UNAMIR budget was not formally approved until April 4, 1994, two days before the genocide.⁵¹ Because of this delay in funding, combined with other administrative problems, the force never received essential equipment and supplies, from armed personnel carriers to ammunition to food and medicine.

Mr. Dallaire informed the UN Secretariat about the weak aspect of the mission's mandate. Significantly, UNAMIR was constituted as a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission instead of a Chapter VII peace enforcement operation. As a peacekeeping mission, it was, essentially, a group of soldier-observers who could only use force to protect themselves, which means that they had right to take aggressive actions against anyone in case there is a direct danger to their lives only. It would categorically not be a peacemaking mission, which has the right to impose peace by force, protecting the civil population.⁵²

Moreover, the mandate was not relevant to the request of Arusha Accords. Where the accords had asked for troops to “guarantee overall security” in the country, the Security Council provided a force that would “contribute” to security, and then only in Kigali, the capital. A provision of the accords that called on Blue Helmets to “assist in tracking arms caches and neutralization of armed gangs” was completely eliminated. Instead of charging the peacekeepers with the critical function of providing security for civilians, they were mandated to “investigate and report on certain incidents.

Dallaire sent his draft rules to New York for the approval of the UN Secretariat in late November.⁵³ By this time, the situation in Rwanda was already rapidly deteriorating. The ferocious violence unleashed by the assassination of Burundi's President Ndadaye a month earlier had sent hundreds of thousands of virulently anti-Tutsi Hutu fleeing into Rwanda, while Hutu radicals in Rwanda exploited the upheaval and the UN personnel was not able to interfere. However, New York never formally responded to the request mandate change.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Krivushin, *One hundred days in the power of madness: The Rwandan genocide 1994*, 11.

⁵¹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Rwanda: the preventable genocide.”

⁵² Roméo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto: Da Capo Press, 2003), 22.

⁵³ Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, 32.

⁵⁴ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Rwanda: the preventable genocide.”

UN personnel in Kigali continued to inform the Secretariat of their concerns, however, about the distribution of arms, the activities of the militias, the killings, and the increased ethnic tension that continued throughout the early months of 1994.⁵⁵ Wholly unanticipated problems did not help ease the tension felt by the UN mission. On January 22, a planeload of arms from France intended for Habyarimana's forces was confiscated by UNAMIR at Kigali airport. The delivery was in violation of the cease-fire agreement of the Arusha Accords, which prohibited the introduction of arms into the area during the transition period. Formally recognizing this point, the French government argued that the delivery stemmed from an old contract and so was technically legal.

On February 2, Mr. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG), wrote that the security situation was deteriorating on a daily basis. There were “increasingly violent demonstrations, nightly grenade attacks, assassination attempts, political and ethnic killings, and we are receiving more and more reliable and confirmed information that the armed militias of the parties are stockpiling and may possibly be preparing to distribute arms to their supporters ... If this distribution takes place, it will worsen the security situation even further and create a significant danger to the safety and security of UN military and civilian personnel and the population at large.”⁵⁶

Mr. Booh-Booh also cited indications that the Rwandan army was preparing for a conflict, stockpiling ammunition, and attempting to reinforce positions in Kigali.⁵⁷ The implications were ominous: “Should the present Kigali defensive concentration posture of UNAMIR be maintained, the security situation will deteriorate even further. We can expect more frequent and more violent demonstrations, more grenade and armed attacks on ethnic and political groups, more assassinations and, quite possibly, outright attacks on UNAMIR installations and personnel, as it took place against the home of the SRSG.”⁵⁸

The Security Council was informed that the situation in the crisis region was not only depressive but also is escalating. That is proven, firstly, by the sides of the conflict, which have already failed important deadlines stated in Arusha Accords between them (including forming coalitional institutions), and, secondly, by the UNAMIR, which has been noting a constant growth of the ceasefire violations number since the very beginning of its deployment in Kigali. Thus, the ceasefire regime is not denied by any side, but any notable provocation may cause a catastrophe.

⁵⁵ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Rwanda: the preventable genocide.”

⁵⁶ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Rwanda: the preventable genocide.”

⁵⁷ Krivushin, *One hundred days in the power of madness: The Rwandan genocide 1994*, 23.

⁵⁸ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Rwanda: the preventable genocide.”

2.4 Current actions and planned initiatives

The work of the delegates begins as the meeting of the UN SC S/PV.3337 which took place on 17 February 1994. This means that **any events that took place at any time following February 16 are not considered to be relevant**. While the background upon the events that took place before the abovementioned date should guide the self-preparation of the delegates, the only source of information for the delegates that matters during the historical simulation is the Secretariat of the Conference, which will provide the Council with the circumstances of the issue via UN informational bulletins and briefings of Secretariat officials.

Delegates will begin the meeting with the consideration of the Statement by the President, draft S/PRST/1994/8, devoted to the topic “The situation concerning Rwanda”, which took place in reality, in frames of the Substantial debates.⁵⁹ The participants should be prepared for commencing negotiations with the discussion upon the text of the document from the perspective of the positions of their states up until the crisis part of the simulation starts.

The agenda item is not expected to be postponed or closed before the issue is resolved, or the Council declares its inability to tackle the problem, which means the failure of all the participants.

On February 17 the Security Council Membership was as shown in the table below. You may also find a brief review of those Members States and basic descriptions of their positions upon the Rwandan issue.

⁵⁹ UN SC, *The situation concerning Rwanda*, S/PRST/1994/8, 17 February 1994, accessed 12 October 2018, <https://undocs.org/en/S/PRST/1994/8>.

Country	Representative
Argentina	Mr. Cardenas
Brazil	Mr. Fujita
China	Mr. Li Zhaoxing
Czech Republic	Mr. Kovanda
Djibouti	Mr. Olhaye
France	Mr. Ladsous
New Zealand	Mr. Keating
Nigeria	Mr. Uhomobhi
Oman	Mr. Al-Khussaiby
Pakistan	Mr. Khan
Russian Federation	Mr. Sidorov
Rwanda	Mr. Bizimana
Spain	Mr. Pedauye
United Kingdom	Sir David Hannay
United States	Mr. Grey

Argentina

While the internal state of affairs in Argentina is becoming stable due to successful economic reforms, the representation of the state in the SC gives it an opportunity to take part in the solution of the most crucial international issues.

The Rwandan crisis is not connected with the interests of Argentina; thus it is able to consider its solution on an unbiased basis.

The state is highly concerned about the limitations the UNAMIR has now in its operating in Rwanda, and the most crucial aspect is the number of personnel. From its perspective, the international society should respond to the Arusha peacekeeping request with a more significant contribution.

Brazil

In frames of Rwandan conflict, Brazilian delegation to the UN stresses the attention of the Security Council on the technical aspect of the UNAMIR in this state. As far as the number of UN personnel in the region is strongly limited, Brazil believes that the deployed staff should be

equipped at the appropriate level. From the political perspective, Brazil claims the necessity of immediately forming of the collegial government, which is the only institution that is able to maintain peace in the country.

China

After the “Tiananmen Massacre” took place in 1989 the Security Council remains as one of the few intergovernmental platforms where the People’s Republic of China is able to act without limitations. Of course, in the company of P-5, where three of its counterparts are Western states, accusing China of the repressions, and one is post-Soviet Russia with west-oriented policy, the positions of China are not so optimistic.

During difficult reforms inside China, this state is not expected to make any risky decisions in the foreign policy, but a notable part in peace building solution in suffering region can become a key to its international reputation restoration.

That is why even though the Rwandan crisis is out of Chinese sphere of interests, Beijing is ready to elaborate on the circumstances UNAMIR is acting in, beginning with its mandate, but it is very careful evaluating the perspective of sending extra peacekeeping forces.

Czech Republic

The Czech Republic, as one of new post-Cold War European states, are actively participated in all the multilateral diplomacy institutions it is able to participate in, and the UN is not an exception.

This state has no special interest in the conflict, and that is an advantage because any proposal from it can be considered as neutral and objective one.

As a reflection of its experience of an intervention of “allied” forces during the “Prague spring”, the Czech government is in favor of abstention of the UN from extra personnel deployment in Rwanda.

Djibouti

The position of Djibouti is unique because of two aspects. On the one hand, it is far enough from Rwanda to be unbiased considering the crisis. On the other hand, Djibouti has quite a similar complex of problems in frames of its subregion, and it has certain experience in dealing with them.

That is why this state has been constantly proposing not only to extend the time frames of the UNAMIR in Rwanda, but also to expand its personnel capacities. Of course, Djibouti itself is not

able to offer the UN any notable amount of its armed forces for the solution of the problem, but the Council is able to find necessary resources among the Member States in case its members have enough political will.

France

Since the French Republic left the military division of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1966, it occupied a special place in the P-5 members of the Council. While general interests of the state were very close to its western allies, France had a certain freedom in its foreign policy in particular directions.

As well as Belgium, the French Republic has a special role in the conflict due to the colonial history of Rwanda. Moreover, in frames of the foreign policy of President Francois Mitterrand, the sides of the conflict are divided into two parts: “Francophone” Government and “Anglophone” Rwandan Patriotic Front, sponsored by Uganda in order to create English speaking “Tutsi-land” in the North of Rwanda.

France has already deployed troops in Rwanda, which comprise a significant part of the mission’s personnel. This means that for that state the maintenance of its citizens’ security is a problem which can become a serious fault of French foreign policy in case of conflict escalation. Thus, the French priority is to provide its corps in Rwanda with allied forces of the Member States.

New Zealand

The 90s were a challenging period in the history of New Zealand. The state faced numerous problems with the economy, which affected most spheres of its citizens’ life, but it did not become a substantial problem for the UN direction of foreign policy since the level of the welfare is not a criterion for having a vote in the SC.

As a state which is not involved in the conflict directly, New Zealand is able to propose an unbiased way the crisis can be ended. That also means that the state will mostly be concentrated on such legislation aspects of the mission as its duration and mandate, not interfering in its personnel capacities.

Nigeria

Both today and in the 90s it was clear that the African Member-States have not been able to solve the problems of the continent by themselves, but it is basically impossible without their participation.

Nigeria is one of the African states which practically forms the African agenda in the United Nations, thus it is not a surprise that a successful solution of the Rwandan crisis is in its direct interest. Besides, a desire for security in the region is not a single reason why Nigeria supports a peaceful solution to the problem. It is not a coincidence that the Rwandan Patriotic Front started its activity in Ugandan territory, and that Mr. Paul Kagame, the leader of the RPF, is a former major in the Nigerian military intelligence complex.

The Nigerian government understands that the implementation of the Arusha Accords is the only way for the Tutsi minority to become included in Rwandan society with rights equal to Hutus, which will finally halt the Tutsi refugee flood to the southern areas of Uganda. Thus, the improvement of the UNAMIR is considered to be quality, but not quantity, from its perspective.

Oman

As well as the delegation of Djibouti, their Omani colleagues are looking for a quantity improvement of the UNAMIR, especially in the capital of Rwanda, Kigali. But it can be only a temporal measure of the conflict solution process. Long-time measures are described in the Arusha Accords and should be implemented, especially the articles devoted to the establishment of the broad-based transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly.

Pakistan

The history of the conflict between India and Pakistan has lots of common aspects with the Hutu-Tutsi confrontation. Due to the fact that Pakistan represents another region, its position has a good chance to be considered as neutral. Moreover, the state is motivated to take part in a successful international solution in a crisis area in order to restore its reputation, which is under scrutiny because of its nuclear activities.

Besides, Pakistan is well known for its active participation in UN peacekeeping missions. That state has a significant experience of such activity, so it would be reasonable for Pakistan to offer its service in tackling the issue.

Russian Federation

1994 is not a year the Russian Federation entered in the best shape. Just several months have passed from the conflict took place between the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, and the leaders of the Supreme Soviet (the parliament of Russia in that period), Chairperson Ruslan Khasbulatov and Vice-President Alexander Rutskoy, finished with ten tanks firing at the upper floors of the “Russian White House”, the residence of the parliament.

Moreover, the security situation in the post-Soviet space as well as in several territories within the country itself is depressing.

Even though, it would be a simplifying to say, that the Russian Federation would prefer to just distance itself from the Rwandan crisis. Of course, Mr. Boris Yeltsin does not declare Russia as a superpower, but the role of a great power in frames of post-Cold War Security Council is what exactly he expects to occupy. Moreover, a diplomatic victory is very beneficial for the Russian government to overcome the internal crisis, thus the role of a mediator is very attractive for this delegation.

That is why the Russian Federation would prefer to solve the Rwandan crisis not in an extensive way, but by increasing the abilities of the UN personnel which are already deployed in the region. Moreover, due to the significant Soviet experience of communications with African states and conflict mediation in that region, Russia has special tools to tackle the situation between the sides of the conflict.

Rwanda

The main aspect about Rwanda, which should be mentioned, is that the delegation of Rwanda in frames of the session is a representative of the government trying to defend the official position.

The primary goal of the representative is to protect the sovereignty of the state and to defend its image in the international arena, but in case the circumstances come to accusing the official Kigali, its mission to the UN will be its only chance to save the regime in power.

Spain

The Kingdom of Spain has significant experience in dealing with post-colonial territories, and, at the same time, has never been present as a colonial administration in Rwanda, thus the local population is expected not to be biased against this Member-State.

However, the abilities of Spain itself as an active actor in the crisis area are limited, and the only chance to affect the situation for this state is using SC mechanisms.

On African issues, Spain relies on its NATO allies. That does not mean that the state is limited in expressing its opinion, but such risky initiatives as deploying extra troops in the affected area are not expected to be proposed by it.

United Kingdom

In contrast with France, Great Britain does not support any side of the conflict. This is basically due to the fact that English- and French-speaking zones in Africa have incongruent values in front of the connections with the British Commonwealth the United Kingdom preserves.

Still, as a P-5 the UK is not expected to shy away from any topic the SC considers, and the Rwandan crisis is not an exception.

The UK has a tendency of supporting demilitarization caused by the end of Cold War, and the Rwandan problem is not considered by the government as a reason to pose a threat to its military personnel by sending them to Africa.

United States of America

The year of 1994 was only the third one after the end of the Cold War, and the United States of America was already far forward from any opponents, but still has not started to use its newly-acquired position of an only superpower in a full scale.

In the case of the Rwandan crisis, the government of the United States is confident that the Arusha Accords are a historical success (which is partially an achievement of the USA itself) and remains a reliable basis for future peacebuilding in Rwanda. From the perspective of the United States, the main problem of crisis solution is that the negotiation process is too slow because of both sides of the conflict. The mandate duration of UNAMIR is completely relevant to the situation, and does not require notable prolongation. Moreover, in the context of the tragic Battle of Mogadishu on 3 October 1993, when American military involvement ended in catastrophe, the United States prefers a careful approach in the aspect of using its military capacities.

2.5 Conclusion

Delegates are expected to begin the consideration of the situation in Rwanda in frames of information they have for the beginning of the session, and then respond to the circumstances they will receive during the crisis. As a result, a solution of the conflict should be found. The delegates should try to find the most effective solution for the crisis, being oriented toward several aspects:

- minimizing the number of victims of the civil population and UN staff (Peacemaking);
- ensuring the ceasefire stability (Peacekeeping);
- forming reliable post-conflict strategy (Peacebuilding).

2.6 Bibliography

- Africa Report. "The Bahutu Manifesto 1957 – The emergence of the Hutu Power in Rwanda." Accessed 12 October 2018. <https://fulviobeltrami africa.wordpress.com/2014/01/14/the-bahutu-manifesto-1957-the-emergence-of-the-hutu-power-in-rwanda/>.
- Cambridge University. "Cambridge Dictionary," Disenfranchise. Accessed 12 October 2018. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/ru/%D1%81%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%8C/%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B3%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9/disenfranchise>.
- Cambridge University. "Cambridge Dictionary," Emancipation. Accessed 12 October 2018. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/ru/%D1%81%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%8C/%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B3%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9/emancipation?q=Emancipation>.
- Dallaire, Roméo. *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*. Toronto: Da Capo Press, 2003.
- Encyclopedia Britannica. "Hutu." Accessed 12 October 2018. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hutu>.
- Encyclopedia Britannica. "Tutsi." Accessed 12 October 2018. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Tutsi>.
- Grupo de Accion Comunitaria. "Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions if the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda." Accessed 14 October 2018. <http://www.psicosocial.net/grupo-accion-comunitaria/centro-de-documentacion-gac/psicologia-y-tecnicas-de-control-social/operaciones-psicologicas/74-target-bosnia-integrating-information-activities-in-peace-operations-nato-led-operations-in-bosnia/file>.
- History world. "History of Rwanda." Accessed 12 October 2018. <http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ad24>.
- International Conflict Research Institute. "Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front." Accessed 14 October 2018. <http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/rwan1.pdf>.
- International Criminal Court. "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court." Accessed 12 October 2018. <https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/RomeStatutEng1.pdf>.
- Krivushin, Ivan. *One hundred days in the power of madness: The Rwandan genocide 1994*. Moscow: Publishing House of the Higher School of Economics, 2015.
- Krivushin, Ivan. *Preparation of the Rwandan genocide 1994: organizing centers and tools*. Moscow: New and recent history, 2012.
- Krivushin, Ivan. *The Church and the Rwandan genocide 1994*. Moscow: New and recent history, 2014.
- Krivushin, Ivan. *The Rwandan genocide at the local level (considering south-west communes of the province of Ruhengeri)*. Moscow: Institute of world history, 2012.
- Krivushin, Ivan. *The Rwandan genocide: reasons, nature, value*. Moscow: Publishing House of Higher School of Economics, 2009.

- Oxford University. "Oxford living dictionaries." Crisis. Accessed 12 October 2018. <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/>.
- Prevent genocide international. "Indangamuntu 1994: Ten years ago in Rwanda this Identity Card cost a woman her life." Accessed 12 October 2018. <http://www.preventgenocide.org/edu/pastgenocides/rwanda/indangamuntu.htm>.
- Prunier, Gérard. *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (Second edition). New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.
- South Africa History Online. "Rwanda." Accessed 12 October 2018. <https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/rwanda>.
- UN GA. *The Crime of Genocide*, A/RES/96-I. 11 December 1996. Accessed 12 October 2018. [http://undocs.org/A/RES/96\(I\)](http://undocs.org/A/RES/96(I)).
- UN SC. *The situation concerning Rwanda*, S/PRST/1994/8. 17 February 1994. Accessed 12 October 2018. <https://undocs.org/en/S/PRST/1994/8>.
- UN SC. *The situation concerning Rwanda*, S/RES/846. 22 June 1993. Accessed 12 October 2018. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/846>.
- UN SC. *The situation concerning Rwanda*, S/RES/872. 5 October 1993. Accessed 12 October 2018. <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/540/63/PDF/N9354063.pdf?OpenElement>.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide". Accessed 14 October 2018. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crimeofgenocide.aspx>.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Emergency Handbook." Accessed 12 October 2018. <https://emergency.unhcr.org/>.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Refworld. "Rwanda: the preventable genocide". Accessed 12 October 2018. <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4d1da8752.pdf>.

2.7 Further research

- Aegis Trust. "Genocide Archive of Rwanda." Accessed 13 October 2018. http://genocidearchiverwanda.org.rw/index.php/Welcome_to_Genocide_Archive_Rwanda.
- One UN. "Rwanda." Accessed 1 November 2018. <http://www.rw.one.un.org/>.
- United Nations International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. Accessed 13 October 2018. <http://unictr.irmct.org/>.

3. THE OPEN AGENDA

3.1 General description

After the end of the historical simulation, the Security Council is going to proceed with an open agenda in frames of the current date of the meeting, considering current challenges. The delegates will start their negotiations by adding agenda items to the list and adopting the order they are to be considered in.

In order to provide the delegates with approximate information upon the issues their colleagues are going to discuss, the participants are to propose an agenda item via e-mail 4 days before the Conference, on December 3 (a special request will be sent). On December 4, the list of proposed issues will be sent to the delegates.

This section of the Background guide is not expected to be a rigid list of agendas set to be covered by the Council. On the contrary, it is written to give the delegates general understanding of what issues are currently in need of being resolved and which may be considered during the MUNRFE Annual Conference 2018.

3.2 Middle Eastern issues

The situation in Syria

The Syrian conflict began as a civil war at the beginning of 2011 and transformed into a multilateral confrontation of both regional and global actors. It is currently the most-discussed topic in frames of the Security Council.

The issue is composed of two main aspects. Firstly, both government forces and the opposition are accused of the usage of chemical weapons, which has taken place several times during the conflict. The problem is that the international community cannot reach a consensus upon which side of the conflict is guilty of these actions. As a result, no specific and effective actions have been taken.

Secondly, there is serious disconnect among the forces fighting terrorism. While the government of Syria, supported by the Russian Federation and Iran, make no difference between the opposition factions and recognize all of them as terrorist groups, the Western states separate the non-governmental forces into terrorist groups and groups of “moderate opposition”, which deserves the support of the international society in its fight both with the regime of Bashar al-Assad and the radical Islamist entities.

The implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

On 14 July 2015, China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the High Representative of the European Union (the E3/EU+3) and the Islamic Republic of Iran have signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was unanimously adopted by the Security Council with its resolution 2231, on 20 July 2015.⁶⁰

The JCPOA is composed of several mutual responsibilities of the states-signatories, which are established in order to resolve the issue of a possible violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by Iran.⁶¹

Unfortunately, the administration of the US President Donald Trump has expressed its concerns about the implementation by Iran its responsibilities and announced the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA, which is actively criticized by the other parties if the Plan.

3.3 African issues

The situation in Libya

The conflict in Libya is not only a significant problem in frames of the African region, but also a serious threat for the practice of Security Council-moderated peace making. The no-fly zone, established by the SC in the territory of Libya with its resolution S/RES/1973, was implemented by a part of the NATO member states and the allied forces (United States, France, United Kingdom, Spain, Denmark, Norway, Canada, Qatar, Italy, and Germany) with serious abuse of the authorized mandate.⁶²

President Muammar al-Gaddafi was disposed of by rebel forces with the support of an international coalition, but a new legitimate government was not formed because the opposition divided into several parties that are hostile to each other. Moreover, international terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State (IS) have become involved in the confrontation. As a result, the situation in the county still has not been stabilized since the transformation of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya into the State of Libya.

The United Nations assists the National Transitional Council of Libya in the peacebuilding process implementation, but the mandate of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya

⁶⁰ UN SC, S/RES/2231, 20 July 2015, accessed 2 November 2018, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2231\(2015\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2231(2015)).

⁶¹ UNODA, "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," accessed 2 November 2018, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text>.

⁶² UN SC, S/RES/2231, 17 March 2011, accessed 5 November 2018, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973%20%282011%29.

(UNSMIL) is limited with its mandate providing political affairs, human rights, transitional justice, mine action, demobilization, development and women's empowerment.⁶³

3.4 Global issues

Children and armed conflicts

International law imposes certain obligations on the states related to the protection of children during armed conflicts, as listed in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocol on the involvement of Children in armed conflict.⁶⁴ It is also described in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977.⁶⁵

Even though the recruitment and use of children by parties of armed conflicts, as well as their recruitment, killing and maiming are issues the Security Council is to reconsider on a regular basis, it remains a serious problem. The problem remains crucial especially because of the existing practice of using children in terrorist acts and sabotage, as it takes place in the activities of the Islamic State, which formed the squads of "lion cubs", composed of children up to 10 years old.⁶⁶ Even the absence of specific care for children in the areas of armed conflict poses a serious threat to their lives, health and, as a result, the future peacebuilding process.

⁶³ UN SC, S/RES/2009, 16 September 2011, accessed 5 November 2018, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2009%20%282011%29.

⁶⁴ OHCHR, "Convention on the Rights of the Child," accessed 2 November 2018, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx>.

⁶⁵ International Committee of Red Cross, "The Geneva Conventions of 12th August 1949," accessed 5 November 2018, <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-0173.pdf>.

⁶⁶ Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, *ISIS: Inside the army of terror* (Moscow: Alpina non-fiction, 2016), 69.

3.5 Bibliography

- OHCHR. "Convention on the Rights of the Child." Accessed 2 November 2018. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx>.
- UNODA. "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." Accessed 2 November 2018. <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text>.
- Weiss, Michael and Hassan Hassan. ISIS: Inside the army of terror. Moscow: Alpina non-fiction, 2016.
- International Committee of Red Cross. "The Geneva Conventions of 12th August 1949." Accessed 5 November 2018. <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-0173.pdf>.
- Nations Online. "Democratic Republic of the Congo." Accessed 5 November 2018. http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/congo_droc.htm.
- UN SC. S/RES/2231. 20 July 2015. Accessed 2 November 2018. [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2231\(2015\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2231(2015)).
- UN SC. S/RES/2009. 16 September 2011. Accessed 5 November 2018. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2009%20%282011%29.
- UN SC. S/RES/2231. 17 March 2011. Accessed 5 November 2018. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973%20%282011%29.

3.6 Further Research

Syria:

- UN SC. S/RES/2426. 29 June 2018. Accessed 2 November 2018. [http://undocs.org/S/RES/2426\(2018\)](http://undocs.org/S/RES/2426(2018)).
- UN SC. S/RES/2393. 19 December 2017. Accessed 7 November 2018. [http://undocs.org/S/RES/2393\(2017\)](http://undocs.org/S/RES/2393(2017)).
- UN SC. S/RES/2042. 14 April 2012. Accessed 7 November 2018. [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2042\(2012\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2042(2012)).
- UN SC. S/RES/2043. 21 April 2012. Accessed 7 November 2018. [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2043\(2012\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2043(2012)).
- UN SC. S/RES/2118. 27 September 2013. Accessed 7 November 2018. [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2118\(2013\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2118(2013)).
- UN SC. S/RES/2139. 22 February 2014. Accessed 7 November 2018. [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2139\(2014\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2139(2014)).
- UN SC. S/RES/2165. 14 July 2014. Accessed 7 November 2018. [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2165\(2014\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2165(2014)).
- UN SC. S/RES/2175. 29 August 2014. Accessed 7 November 2018. [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2175\(2014\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2175(2014)).
- UN SC. S/RES/2191. 17 December 2014. Accessed 7 November 2018. [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2191\(2014\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2191(2014)).
- UN SC. S/RES/2209. 6 March 2015. Accessed 7 November 2018. [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2209\(2015\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2209(2015)).

- UN SC. S/RES/2235. 7 August 2015. Accessed 7 November 2018.
[https://undocs.org/S/RES/2235\(2015\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2235(2015)).
- UN SC. S/RES/2254. 18 December 2015. Accessed 7 November 2018.
[https://undocs.org/S/RES/2254\(2015\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2254(2015)).
- UN SC. S/RES/2258. 22 December 2015. Accessed 7 November 2018.
[https://undocs.org/S/RES/2258\(2015\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2258(2015)).
- UN SC. S/RES/2268. 26 February 2016. Accessed 7 November 2018.
[https://undocs.org/S/RES/2268\(2016\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2268(2016)).
- UN SC. S/RES/2286. 3 May 2016. Accessed 7 November 2018.
[https://undocs.org/S/RES/2286\(2016\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2286(2016)).
- UN SC. S/RES/2332. 21 December 2016. Accessed 7 November 2018.
[https://undocs.org/S/RES/2332\(2016\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2332(2016)).
- UN SC. S/RES/2336. 31 December 2016. Accessed 7 November 2018.
[https://undocs.org/S/RES/2336\(2016\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2336(2016)).
- UN SC. S/PRST/2012/6. 21 March 2012. Accessed 7 November 2018.
<https://undocs.org/S/PRST/2012/6>.
- UN SC. S/PRST/2012/10. 5 April 2012. Accessed 7 November 2018.
<https://undocs.org/S/PRST/2012/10>.
- UN SC. S/PRST/2015/10. 24 April 2015. Accessed 7 November 2018.
<https://undocs.org/S/PRST/2015/10>.
- UN SC. S/PRST/2013/15. 2 October 2013. Accessed 7 November 2018.
<https://undocs.org/S/PRST/2013/15>.
- UN SC. S/PRST/2015/15. 17 August 2015. Accessed 7 November 2018.
<https://undocs.org/S/PRST/2015/15>.
- UN SC. S/PRST/2011/16. 3 August 2011. Accessed 7 November 2018.
<https://undocs.org/S/PRST/2011/16>.

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action implementation:

- UN SC. *Letter dated 16 July 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council*, S/2015/544. 16 July 2015. Accessed 2 November 2018. <https://undocs.org/S/2015/544>.
- UN SC. “Resolution 2231 (2015).” Background. Accessed 2 November 2018.
<http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/>.
- UN SC. S/RES/1696. 31 July 2006. Accessed 7 November 2018.
[https://undocs.org/S/RES/1696\(2006\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1696(2006)).
- UN SC. S/RES/1737. 27 December 2006. Accessed 7 November 2018.
[https://undocs.org/S/RES/1737\(2006\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1737(2006)).
- UN SC. S/RES/1747. 24 March 2007. Accessed 7 November 2018.
[https://undocs.org/S/RES/1747\(2007\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1747(2007)).
- UN SC. S/RES/1803. 3 March 2008. Accessed 7 November 2018.
[https://undocs.org/S/RES/1803\(2008\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1803(2008)).

UN SC. S/RES/1835. 27 September 2008. Accessed 7 November 2018.

[https://undocs.org/S/RES/1835\(2008\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1835(2008)).

UN SC. S/RES/1929. 9 June 2010. Accessed 7 November 2018.

[https://undocs.org/S/RES/1929\(2010\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1929(2010)).

UN SC. S/RES/2224. 9 June 2015. Accessed 7 November 2018.

[https://undocs.org/S/RES/2224\(2015\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2224(2015)).

Libya:

UN SC. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya.* S/2018/140. 12 February 2018. Accessed 7 November 2018.

<https://undocs.org/S/2018/140>.

UN SC. S/2018/780. 24 August 2018. Accessed 7 November 2018.

<https://undocs.org/S/2018/780>.

UN SC. S/RES/2434 (2018). 13 September 2018. Accessed 2 November 2018.

[http://undocs.org/S/RES/2434\(2018\)](http://undocs.org/S/RES/2434(2018)).

Children and armed conflicts:

UN SC. S/RES/2427 (2018). 9 July 2018. Accessed 2 November 2018.

[http://undocs.org/S/RES/2427\(2018\)](http://undocs.org/S/RES/2427(2018)).

UN SC. S/RES/1261. 30 August 1999. Accessed 7 November 2018.

[https://undocs.org/S/RES/1261\(1999\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1261(1999)).

UN SC. S/RES/1379. 20 November 2001. Accessed 7 November 2018.

[https://undocs.org/S/RES/1379\(2001\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1379(2001)).

UN SC. S/RES/1612. 26 July 2005. Accessed 7 November 2018.

[https://undocs.org/S/RES/1612\(2005\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1612(2005)).

UN SC. S/RES/2143. 7 March 2014. Accessed 7 November 2018.

[https://undocs.org/S/RES/2143\(2014\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2143(2014)).



© MUNRFE. All rights reserved.